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CASE COMMENTS
todial proceeding.37 As long as the presumption of fitness of the sur-
viving parent is not overcome by the opposing party, that parent will
be awarded custody even though the opposing party may be more fit
as a custodian.
In conclusion, there appears to be merit in both the minority and
majority approaches. The majority approach is undoubtedly the more
practical one in relation to the status of custody of the child immed-
iately upon the death of the parental custodian, while the minority
approach is more adequate in requiring jurisdiction to be in the
original divorce court when custody is contested.
JAY FREDEIUCK WILKS
PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY AND PARENTAL IMMUNITY
Under the traditional theory of partnerships-the aggregate theory,
the members are jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts
committed by a partner while acting in the course of employment.'
However, a somewhat different theory, the entity theory, has found
expression in several jurisdictions. Under this theory suits are
authorized against the partnership as a legal entity.
2 Under the
aggregate theory, liability results from the common law principle of
respondeat superior, each partner being deemed the agent or servant
of the other partners.3 The entity theory naturally leads, by the same
agency principle, to imposing firm liability for the acts of its agents
and servants.
In a jurisdiction that allows the partnership to be sued as a legal
-"-See note 36 supra. In the Hutchinson case the court said, "'The father is the
natural guardian of his infant children, and in the absence of good and sufficient
cause... is entitled to their custody.' "
'Uniform Partnership Act § 15(a); Crane, Partnerships § 64 (2d ed. 1952).
-Hotchkiss v. Di Vita, 103 Conn. 436, 13o Ad. 668 (1925); Chisholm v. Chisholm
Constr. Co., 298 Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390 (1941); In re Zents' Estate, 148 Neb. 104,
26 N.W.2d 793 (1917); State v. Pielsticker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N.W. 51 (1929); Cas-
well v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 149 At. 746 (1930); Byers v. Schlupe, 51
Ohio St. 300, 38 N.E. 117 (1894); Southard v. Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P:2d 780 (Okla.
1956); Fowler v. Brooks, 193 Okla. 580, 146 P.2d 304, 307 (1944); Anderson v.
Dukes, 193 Okla. 395, 143 P.2d 8oo (1943); Hassen v. Rogers, 123 Okla. 265, 253 Pac.
72, 74 (1926); Dunbar v. Farnum, 1o9 Vt. 313, 196 At. 237 (1937)-
'Morrison v. Coombs, 23 F. Supp. 852 (D. Me. 1938); Rogers v. Carmichael, 58
Ga. App. 343, 198 S.E. 318 (1938); Schloss v. Silverman, 172 Md. 632, 192 Ad. 343
(1937); Roux v. Lawand, 131 Me. 215, 16o Atl. 756 (1932); Caswell v. Maplewood
Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 149 At. 746 (1930); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 415, 198
N.E. 23 (1935); Uniform Partnership Act §§ 9, 13.
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entity, the question can arise as to whether the doctrine of parental
immunity is affected when an unemancipated child of a partner sues
the partnership for a personal tort committed by his father. This was
the question presented to the Supreme Court of Iowa in Cody v. J.A.
Dodds & Sons.4
An action was brought on behalf of an unemancipated child
against a partnership, which included the child's father as a member,
for injuries sustained as a result of the father's negligence while act-
ing in the course of partnership business. As authorized by the Iowa
Rules of Civil Procedure the partnership was named as sole defendant.
The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that an unemancipated child cannot maintain an action for damages
for personal injuries caused by his father. The trial court overruled
the motion, and the defendant subsequently suffered an adverse de-
cision. On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the action of the
trial court. The court assumed, for the purpose of the decision, that
an unemancipated child may not maintain an action against his
parent to recover damages for injuries caused by negligence. The
court reasoned that since a partnership is considered a legal entity,
the fact that the plaintiff's father is a member of the firm does not
immunize the partnership from the alleged -tort. The holding em-
phasizes that a partnership is a separate entity and may be sued as
such; it cannot assert personal immunities available to an individual
partner; and its liability is distinct from that of the members.
Under the aggregate theory, each partner is considered an agent
of the other partners, and the partners are jointly and severally liable 5
for any tortious acts committed by a partner while acting in the course
of his employment.0 The aggregate theory is the majority view of part-
nership liability, and the view taken by the Uniform Partnership Act.
7
The plaintiff may institute an action against all or any members of
the partnership at his option. If the suit is brought against all the
partners and a judgment is obtained, it can be satisfied from the part-
nership property (joint assets) or the individual property of any part-
ner as a joint tortfeasor. If, on the other hand, the suit is brought
against only one partner on the theory that liability is several as well
4
11o N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1961).
5Roux v. Lawand, 13x Me. gi 5, 16o At. 756 (1932); Caplan v. Caplan, 268
N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935); Uniform Partnership Act § i5(a); Crane, Partnerships
§ 64 (2d ed. 1952); Henn, Corporations § 24 (1961).
GSee note 3 supra.
7Uniform Partnership Act § 15.
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as joint, the satisfaction of a judgment can be taken only from the
partner's separate, individual property.S
Several jurisdictions have recognized the partnership as an entity,-"
and permit a suit to be instituted against the partnership by merely
naming the firm.10 Under this practice, a judgment is against the
partnership and execution cannot be levied on the personal assets
of a partner unless he is individually joined in the action." The judg-
ment is said to invoke the joint liability of the partners.12 This joint
liability does not attach to the personal assets of the partners, but at-
taches only to the firm assets which are the joint interests of the part-
ners. Therefore, each partner is affected under the entity theory only
to the extent of his interest in the firm, and his personal liability
cannot be invoked unless he is joined as a party defendant with the
partnership. Thus the distinction between the aggregate theory and
the entity theory is upon whom liability is placed. Under the aggre-
gate theory, if all the partners are sued, firm assets and also each
partner's personal assets can be reached in satisfaction of a judgment
because all the pariner. are before the court as joint tortfeasors. How-
ever, if only one partner is sued, only his personal assets can be
reached. Under the entity theory, in which only the firm is named,
only firm assets can be reached in satisfaction of judgment because
only the firm is before the court, unless individual partners are
joined in the action.
In the New York case, Caplan v. Caplan,'3 the plaintiff, in an ac-
tion for personal injuries received as a result of her husband's negli-
gence while acting in the course of his employment, was denied a
8Roux v. Lawand, 131 Me. 215, i6o Ati. 756 (1932); Camhi v. ILGWU, 28 Misc.
2d 93, 2o8 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (Sup. Ct. 196o); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198
N.E. 23 (1935); In re Peck, 2o6 N.Y. 55, 99 N.E. 258 (1912); Boston Foundary Co.
v. Whiteman, 31 R.I. 88, 76 Atl. 757, 759 (191o); Dixon v. Haynes, 146 Wash. 163,
262 Pac. 119, 221 (1927).
"See note 2 supra.
"Hotchkiss v. Di Vita, 1o3 Conn. 436, 13o Atd. 668 (1925); Markam v. Buck-
ingham, 21 Iowa 494 (1866); Mexican Mill v. Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co.,
4 Nev. 40 (1868); Byers v. Schlupe, 51 Ohio St. 300, 38 N.E. 117 (1894); Hamner
v. B. K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 Pac. 770 (1898).
"
1
Holmes v. Alexander, 52 Okla. 122, 152 Pac. 819, 820 (1915); Heton v. Schaef-
fer, 34 Okla. 631, 126 Pac. 797, 798 (1912); Hamner v. B. K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah
436, 52 Pac. 770 (1898); Dunbar v. Farnum, io9 Vt. 313, 196 At. 237 (1937). Accord,
Hassen v. Rogers, 123 Okla. 265, 253 Pac. 72 (1926).
2Deen) v. Hotel & Apartment Clerks' Union, 57 Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134 P.2d
328, 33o (App. Dep't 1943); Nathan v. Thomas, 63 Fla. 235, 58 So. 247, 248 (1912);
Heaton v. Schaeffer, 34 Okla. 631, 126 Pac. 797, 798 (1912); Hamner v. B. K. Block
&. Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 Pac. 770 (t898). Accord, Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty
Co., 357 Pa. 23, 53 A.2d 73 (1947).
1a268 N.Y. 415, 198 N.E. 23 (1935).
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recovery against the partnership of which he was a member. The suit
was brought against all the partners, jointly. The court, following the
aggregate theory,' 4 reasoned that since the plaintiff could satisfy a
judgment from the partners' joint assets in the firm, necessarily in-
volving her immune husband's interest therein, the suit must be dis-
missed. The court also pointed out that she did not have to assert
her claim against firm assets, but could reach individual assets if she
so chose because all the partners were before the court; but this
would be unfair to the other partners because she could not choose
her husband. Therefore, her husband's immunity should not be cir-
cumvented merely because the plaintiff could choose the assets out
of which to take satisfaction. The court further resolved that if the
plaintiff had sued only one partner instead of all the partners as she
did, recovery would have also been denied. Since the husband would
have been immune if he had been the partner sued separately, it
would be unfair to allow recovery against another partner merely be-
cause the plaintiff chose to sue him, not her husband.
Under the aggregate theory, if a non-wrongdoing partner is held
liable, under agency principles, he is entitled to indemnification from
the tortfeasor.15 Under the entity theory the partnership has a right
to indemnification against the wrongdoing partner.16 Thus, eventual-
ly, if recovery is allowed against a partner or partners, or the partner-
ship under either theory of partnerships, the parent will ultimately
be liable for the whole amount; hence a result which is denied direct-
ly is reached by a circuity of suits. Therefore, the courts usually deny
recovery in the first instance against the partner or the partnership
for a tort committed by a partner against his own unemancipated
child. The principal case does not say whether the firm has a right to
indemnification from the parent partner. The court was not required
to decide this issue, since parental immunity was assumed for purposes
of this decision only.
Under strict agency principles, the master is not shielded by his
servant's personal immunity, despite the fact that he is entitled to
indemnification. 7 The rationale behind denying the master a right
14198 N.E. at 25.
15Restatement (Second), Agency § 14A (958); Id. §§ 3 17A, comment a and 4ol,
comment d.
""The law of partnership is the law of agency .... When a loss is paid by a
partnership, there is a right of indemnity against the partner whose negligence
caused the loss." United Brokers' Co. v. Dose, 143 Ore. 283, 22 P.2d 204, 205 (1933);
Restatement (Second), Agency § 3 17A, comment a (1958)-
,-Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 5o3, 5o S.E.2d 540 (1918)* Restatement (Second),
Agency § 217, comment 1 (1958).
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to assert his servant's parental immunity is that the master, in seeking
indemnification, does not need to proceed on a theory of subrogation,
but may proceed on the theory of breach of duty by a fiduciary, so
that the parent is not a necessary party to the original controversy 1 8
By using indemnification based on breach of a fiduciary duty, a duty
not to impose an unauthorized expense on the principal, instead of
indemnification based on subrogation, stepping into the injured
party's shoes, the court is merely ignoring the reason for the princi-
pal's liability in the first instance.
Following the above agency principles to their logical end, since a
partner is deemed to be the agent of the partnership, then liability
could be imposed on the partnership or other partners despite the
husband's immunity and indemnification sought for the breach of
duty of the partner as a fiduciary.19 However, partnership liability
is imposed only to the extent of the wrongdoer's liability.20 Thus it
appears that if the father was a mere agent of the firm and not a
partner, recovery would be allowed. In other words, since the immune
party is ultimately' liable under agency principles, a circuity of suits
is permitted absent a partnership relation, merely by ignoring the
reason for the principal's liability and allowing indemnification on
the theory of breach of duty by a fiduciary instead of subrogation.
It is submitted that if the parental immunity doctrine is to be
sustained, the entity theory of partnership provides no solution where
the immune parent is a member of the firm. Since liability under the
entity theory involves only partnership assets, it could be rationalized
that there is no violation of the immunity doctrine because the father's
personal liability is not directly involved. The payment of the judg-
ment out of partnership assets would be treated like the payment of
any other business expense. However, since it seems that the firm has
a right to seek indemnification, the father will ultimately be held
liable, so that a result is reached indirectly that is denied directly, re-
gardless of which theory is used to obtain indemnification. Further-
more, if some of the partners are individually joined and firm assets
are insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the personal assets of those
partners would be subject to payment of the judgment. This is unfair,
IsMi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938); Chase v.
New Haven Waste Material Corp., xii Conn. 377, 15o AtI. 107, io8 (1930); Restate-
ment (Second), Agency § 217, comment a (1958).
fC. Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
See generally 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429 (1935).
mBelleson v. Skileck, i85 Minn. 537, 242 NAV. t (1932); Uniform Partnership
Act §§ 13, 15.
